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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Dunn challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence
following his warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the police officer's
presence. Due to the unconstitutional arrest, Mr. Dunn submits the district court should have
granted his motion and suppressed the evidence found after the dog alerted on his car which
resulted in officers finding methamphetamine. Mindful that the evidence he seeks to suppress
may have inevitably been discovered had the arrest not occurred, Mr. Dunn respectfully requests
this Court reverse the district court's order denying suppression and vacate his judgment of
conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 27, 2019, Officer Ben Kettering responded to a report of a battery.
(Tr. 10/1/19, p.9, L.1 - p.10, L.12.) Upon arriving at the location, Officer Kettering saw two
vehicles pulled to the side of the road, both with bumper damage. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.11, L.4 - p.12,
L.1.) Officer Kettering spoke to Andrew Dunn, whose white BMW had sustained rear bumper
damage from a grey pickup truck. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.11, Ls.4-23; p.12, Ls.23-25; p.17, Ls.14-16;
Defendant's Exhibit A, 9:26-10:10.) Mr. Dunn, who was sitting on the curb, told the officer that
he slapped the reporting party after the man had engaged in aggressive driving, which caused the
accident. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.20, Ls.1-8; Defendant's Exhibit A, 9:26-11:25.) Mr. Dunn also told
Officer Kettering that his driver's license was suspended. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.20, Ls.1-5; p.21, L.24 p.22, L.1; p.35, Ls.23-25.)

After interviewing the reporting party and Mr. Dunn, Officer

Kettering arrested Mr. Dunn for misdemeanor battery. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.22, Ls.7-8; p.34, Ls.16-
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24.) He handcuffed Mr. Dunn and placed him in the back of his patrol car. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.22,
Ls.7-21; p.35, Ls.12-20.)
A short time later, Officer Kettering told Mr. Dunn he was under arrest for two
misdemeanors, battery and driving without privileges. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.35, Ls.12-20.) Officer
Kettering did not see either the alleged battery or Mr. Dunn driving the car. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.25,
Ls.7-9; p.35, Ls.9-25.) Mr. Dunn's car was parked partially in the road. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.33, Ls.38.) Mr. Dunn initially asked the officer to have his car towed, but later attempted to make
arrangements for a friend to come get the car. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.22, Ls.12-17; p.44, Ls.14-17.)
However, Officer Kettering did not cancel the tow truck.

(Tr. 10/1/19, p.44, Ls.14-23.) A

canine drug detection dog was requested after the officer learned that Mr. Dunn had previously
been charged with a drug-related offense. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.27, Ls.8-llp.36, Ls.13-21.) Officer
Kettering was writing the misdemeanor citations when the drug dog arrived and alerted on
Mr. Dunn's car. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.28, Ls.11-21; p.31, Ls.6-9.) After the canine sniff, a tow truck
arrived at the scene. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.28, L.22 - p.29, L.2.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information alleging Mr. Dunn committed the
crime of felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor battery, and misdemeanor
inattentive driving. (R., pp.54-55.)
Mr. Dunn filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.63-64.) He argued the evidence must be
suppressed because of his warrantless arrest.

(R., p.63.)

In a memorandum in support,

Mr. Dunn, relying on State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393 (2019), asserted Officer Kettering arrested
him in violation of Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution because Officer Kettering
arrested him for a misdemeanor battery committed outside the officer's presence (also known as
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a completed misdemeanor 1).

(Aug., pp.1-4.)

Due to the unconstitutional arrest, Mr. Dunn

maintained all evidence obtained after his arrest must be suppressed. (Aug., pp.1-4.)
The State filed a memorandum in opposition. (Aug., pp.5-10.) The State argued Clarke
was inapplicable because Mr. Dunn's arrest was a citizen's arrest pursuant to LC. § 16-606.
(Aug. pp.6-7.)

The State also asserted that the evidence obtained after the dog alerted on

Mr. Dunn's car would have inevitably discovered such that the evidence was not a fruit of the
poisonous tree. (Aug., pp.7-9.) The State claimed that because Mr. Dunn's driver's license was
suspended, he was unable to drive his vehicle from the scene, and a drug detection dog could
have been deployed around the vehicle at anytime while it was parked. (Aug., pp.7-8.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Dunn's motion. (See generally Tr. 10/1/19, p.6,
L.4 - p.75, L.10.) Officer Kettering testified, and the district court admitted the officer's body
cam as an exhibit. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.6, L.16-p.57, L.3.) Mr. Dunn also challenged the duration of
the stop, asserting that the stop was unlawfully extended. (Tr. 10/1/19, p. 40, L.16 - p.42, L.2.)
After argument by the parties, the district court took the matter under advisement following the
submission of supplemental briefing by the parties. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.68, L.11 - p. 75, L.3.)
The district court pronounced its ruling at a hearing the next week.

(See generally

Tr. 10/9/19.)
The district made the following factual findings:
The officer was responding to an alleged battery. When the officer arrived at the
scene on March 27th, 2019, the alleged victim indicated that he wanted to pursue
charges, battery charges against the defendant, and that [the] alleged victim
signed the citation at approximately eight minutes into the video.
During the investigation of the alleged battery, the defendant admitted to the
officer that his driver's license was suspended and indicated that he was on his
1

A completed misdemeanor has also been described as "one which is no longer in progress when
the officer arrives on the scene." Clarke, 165 Idaho at 398 n.6.
3

way to the DMV to take care of that matter, and that he had been the person
driving the vehicle that was involved in the altercation with the alleged victim.
So there was the defendant's car and there was also the truck of the alleged victim
in the video.
But the defendant admitted to the officer that he knew his driver's license was
suspended and that he was driving. Therefore, there's evidence that the Court can
find that the defendant was driving without privileges and could have been
arrested on that charge. And that he was not able to drive the vehicle away
because he did not have a valid license to drive the vehicle. On the video there is
no other person that the Court could observe in the white car that was capable of
driving the vehicle.
Additionally, based on the testimony on the video, the Court finds that the vehicle
was clearly parked in the roadway. There was cars going both directions on the
road. There was a solid white line that appeared to be some type of bike lane is
what the officer thought it was on the video. It is clearly a lane that you are not
allowed to park in. So it was not a possibility to leave the defendant's vehicle off
to the side of the roadway without creating a potential hazard to other drivers as
the officer testified to.
The officer testified that the defendant informed him that he wanted his vehicle
towed. The officer testified that that was going to be a courtesy tow, that he did
not intend to impound or have the po lice department take custody over the
vehicle, but just to have the vehicle towed to get it off the roadway as requested
by the defendant.
But the officer never testified that he was going to allow the defendant to drive off
based on the fact that it was support - that the - there was evidence that the
defendant's driver's license was suspended at the time the officer called in to
dispatch and verified the status of the defendant's license.
The officer, Kettering, also testified he was not the officer who requested the K9
be called to the scene. He was not sure exactly who requested the K9. And the
video clearly indicates that this officer was properly and efficiently investigating
the alleged battery as well as the driving without privileges that was discovered as
part ofhis investigation of the battery.
(Tr. 10/9/19, p.7, L.8 - p.9, L.19.) The district court rejected Mr. Dunn's argument that Officer
Kettering's arrest for a completed misdemeanor was unconstitutional. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.11, L.7 p.12, L.24.) The court reasoned that although the defendant was arrested on the battery charge
initially, and then the officer later clarified that he was also being arrested for driving without
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privileges (DWP), the defendant would still have been detained for the DWP. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.11
Ls.7-12.)
The district court reasoned:
And even the writing up of the citation on the battery, even if the officer really
didn't have constitutional power to arrest the defendant on the battery since he
had not seen, observed or been present when the alleged battery took place, and
that such an arrest may be in violation of State v. Clark, 165 Idaho 393, 2019, the
Court really doesn't find that this is a Clark case.
Because while the defendant was arrested, the officer could have detained the
defendant while he was investigating both the battery and the DWP. And it
wasn't the unlawful - alleged unlawful arrest that led to the search of the vehicle,
it was an independent dog alert, the drug dog alert that led to the probable cause
that allowed the search of the vehicle.
So the alleged unlawful, unconstitutional arrest, if this is deemed a Clark
situation, simply is not linked to the probable cause from the dog sniff which
would have allowed the car to have been searched without a warrant. And the
Court doesn't feel it is even necessary to determine whether or not the facts of this
case are by analogy a citizen's arrest because there is clear evidence that the
defendant admitted to driving without privileges, and that gave the officer
probable cause to arrest the defendant.
(Tr. 10/9/19, p.11, L.13 - p.12, L.15.) The district court determined Officer Kettering did not
unlawfully delay the stop to allow the drug dog to arrive. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.10, L.22 - p.11, L.6.)
In short, the district court held the additional time the officer took to write the citation for
battery, in addition to the citation for DWP, was not unnecessary time and did not unlawfully
extend the stop. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.12, L.16 - p.13, L.5.)
Alternatively, the district court concluded that the drugs would have inevitably been
discovered because the K9 alerted before the officer was done writing the citations. (Tr. 10/9/19
Tr., p.13, L.6-p.14, L.25.) The free dog sniff occurred while the officer was waiting for the tow
truck-during proper and predictable investigatory procedures. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.14, Ls.10-25.)
"The evidence in the vehicle was inevitably discovered independent of any taint related to the
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arrest on the battery charge," and the evidence was "not causally linked to the arrest on the
battery charge."

(Tr. 10/9/19, p.16, Ls.11-15.)

For these reasons, the district court denied

Mr. Dunn's motion. (Tr. 10/9/19, p.17, Ls.1-61 R., pp.94-95.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Dunn pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled
substance and misdemeanor battery.
R., pp.80-90.)

(Tr. 10/16/19, p.5, Ls.9-11, p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.1;

The State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor inattentive driving charge.

(Tr. 10/16/19, p.7, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Dunn reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his
motion to suppress. (Tr. 10/16/19, p.6, Ls.19-25; R., pp.83, 89.) The district court imposed a
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for the felony offense, but retained jurisdiction.
(Tr. 12/18/19, p.90, Ls.20-25; R., pp.102-107.) Mr. Dunn was sentenced to one-hundred eighty
days, with credit for time served, for the misdemeanor offense. (Tr. 12/18/19, p.91, Ls.12-16;
R., pp. I 02-103.) After a period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Dunn's sentence was suspended and

he was placed on probation for four years. (Aug. 2, pp.1-10.)
Mr. Dunn timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.10810.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Dunn's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his
warrantless arrest for a completed misdemeanor?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Dunn's Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained From
His Warrantless Arrest For A Completed Misdemeanor

A.

Introduction
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits warrantless arrests for completed

misdemeanors.

Clarke, 165 Idaho at 399.

Here, Officer Kettering arrested Mr. Dunn in

violation of Article 1, Section 17 because Officer Kettering arrested Mr. Dunn for a completed
misdemeanor. All evidence obtained by Officer Kettering after Mr. Dunn's arrest was subject to
suppression as the fruit of the unconstitutional arrest. Mindful that the evidence he seeks to
suppress may have been discovered regardless of the arrest, Mr. Dunn respectfully requests this
Court reverse the district court's order denying suppression and vacate his judgment of
conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court applies a
bifurcated standard ofreview. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009). This
Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous
but will freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.

State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 646--47 (2017).

C.

Mr. Dunn's Warrantless Arrest For A Completed Misdemeanor Violated His Idaho
Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Seizures
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

8

IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. "In some instances," this Court has "construed Article I, section 17,
to provide greater protection than is provided by the United States Supreme Court's construction
of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 519 (2012). The Court provides
"greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and
our long-standing jurisprudence." Id. (quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472 (2001)); see
also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987-88 (1992) (discussing the Court's power to interpret

the Idaho Constitution independently and grant Idaho citizens more protection).
In Clarke, the Court interpreted the protections provided to Idaho citizens in Article I,
Section 17 for warrantless arrests. First, the Court recognized Article I, Section 17 had "long
been interpreted in conjunction with Idaho Code section 19-603 and its predecessor statutes,
which were in place at the time of the adoption of the Idaho Constitution." Clarke, 446 P.3d at
454 (citing State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 888 (2015)).

Idaho Code § 19-603 and its

predecessors outlined the statutory guidelines for a warrantless arrest:
Until 1979, the interpretation of the Constitution and the statutes that preceded
Idaho Code section 19-603 largely echoed the general rule of federal cases-that
a warrantless arrest was lawful if the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe a felony had been committed or if the offender had committed a
misdemeanor in the presence of the officer.
Clarke, 165 Idaho at 396 (citations omitted). Then, in 1979, the legislature added subsection 6 to

LC. § 19-603.

Id.

This subsection allowed warrantless arrests for certain misdemeanors

committed outside the officer's presence, provided the officer had probable cause to believe the
arrestee committed the misdemeanor and the arrest was in "immediate response to a report of a
commission of a crime." LC. § 19-603(6). Thus, "the constitutional standard and the statutory
standard" for warrantless arrests "diverged." Clarke, 165 Idaho at 396. Article I, Section 17
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prohibited warrantless arrests for completed misdemeanors, but LC. § 19-603(6) allowed them
for certain enumerated misdemeanors, including assault. 2
The Clarke Court's review of the common law showed a police officer could not make a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed outside the officer's presence. Id. at 397-99.
The Court concluded, "based upon the state of the common law in 18 89, we conclude that the
framers of the Idaho Constitution understood that Article I, section 17 prohibited warrantless
arrests for completed misdemeanors." Id. at 399. While the Clarke Court was "fully mindful of
the significance of this conclusion," it determined the "extremely powerful policy
considerations" to support upholding LC. § 19-603(6) "must yield to the requirements of the
Idaho Constitution." Id. at 399-400.

2

LC. § 19-603 currently states in full:
A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. When a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person arrested to have committed it.
4. On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by
the party arrested.
5. At night, when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a
felony.
6. When upon immediate response to a report of a commission of a crime there is
probable cause to believe that the person has committed a violation of section 18901 (assault), 18-903 (battery), 18-918 (domestic violence), 18-7905 (first-degree
stalking), 18-7906 (second-degree stalking), 39-6312 (violation of a protection
order), 18-920 (violation of a no contact order), or 18-33021 (threatening violence
upon school grounds--firearms and other deadly or dangerous weapons), Idaho
Code.
7. When there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evidence
observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the officer upon
immediate response to a report of a commission of a crime aboard an aircraft, that
the person arrested has committed such a crime.

Mr. Dunn asserts that the evidence obtained following his arrests for battery and driving
without privileges should be suppressed.

The district court found Officer Kettering arrested

Mr. Dunn for the completed misdemeanor of battery. (Tr. 10/1/19, p.12, Ls.16-17.) However,
the court concluded, "And even the writing up of the citation on the battery, even if the officer
really didn't have constitutional power to arrest the defendant on the battery since he had not
seen, observed or been present when the alleged battery took place," the case was not impacted
by Clarke, "Because while the defendant was arrested, the officer could have detained the
defendant while he was investigating both the battery and the DWP." (Tr. 10/1/19, p.11, Ls.1323.) The district court concluded that the duration of the stop was not unlawfully extended, and
that the State's inevitable discovery doctrine applied to the facts of Mr. Dunn's case.
(Tr. 10/1/19, p.12, L.24-p.14, L.25.)
Evidence obtained in violation of the United States and Idaho constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 515-19 (2012); State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009). This exclusionary rule "applies to evidence obtained directly from the
illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, there are
various exceptions to the exclusionary rule, including the inevitable discovery doctrine. See

State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).
"[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into
the lawful actions law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful
avenue that led to the evidence." State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017) (citing Nix v.

Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
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497 (2001)) (emphasis in original). "The premise is that law enforcement should be 'in the
same, not a worse, position that they would have been' absent the misconduct." Id. (quoting Nix,
467 U.S. at 443 (majority opinion)).

However, "[t]he doctrine must presuppose inevitable

hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the
officers' unlawful conduct." Id. at 32. Thus, the inevitable discovery doctrine "'is not intended
to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for
what they really did."' Id. (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985)). The
inevitable discovery doctrine requires the State to show: (1) that "certain proper and predictable
investigatory procedures would have been utilized;" and (2) the State must demonstrate that
"those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence in question."
State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 216-17 (Ct. App. 1984).

Here, the State asserted that, because Mr. Dunn's driving privileges were suspended and
he could not drive his car away from the scene, it was necessary to tow his car. (Aug., p.11.)
The State claimed that because the parked car could have been sniffed by a K-9 at any time, the
discovery of the methamphetamine was inevitable. (Aug., p.12.)
The district court considered the State's inevitable discovery argument and concluded
that the drugs would have inevitably been discovered because the dog sniff occurred while the
officer was waiting for the tow truck-during proper and predictable investigatory procedures.
(Tr. 10/9/19, p.14, Ls.10-25.)
[T]he K9 had already been ordered by another officer or requested by another
officer, and that the free dog sniff around the vehicle that was not going to be
moved, that the officer was waiting for the tow truck to arrive for the courtesy tow
was not a violation of the defendant's right. And it was a proper and predictable
investigatory procedure to have the dog sniff the car.

12

(Tr.10/9/19, p.14, L.13-20.) The district court concluded, "both requirements of the inevitable
discovery doctrine apply in this case." (Tr.10/9/19, p.14, Ls.24-25.) "The evidence in the
vehicle was inevitably discovered independent of any taint related to the arrest on the battery
charge," and the evidence was "not causally linked to the arrest on the battery charge."
(Tr. 10/9/19, p.16, Ls.11-15.)
However, Mr. Dunn asserts that, in light of Clarke, Officer Kettering's warrantless arrest
of Mr. Dunn for a completed misdemeanor violated his state constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable seizures. Therefore, the district court erred by denying Mr. Dunn's motion to
suppress. Due to the unconstitutional arrest, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the
evidence obtained by Officer Kettering. "The value of the exclusionary rule was recognized by
this Court long before the United States Supreme Court required it for fourth amendment
violations."

State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 592 (1978).

"Idaho had clearly developed an

exclusionary rule as a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures in
addition to other purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent for police misconduct." Donato, 135 Idaho at 472. "The rule is well settled in this
state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's constitutional immunity from search and
seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if request for its suppression be timely made."
Koivu, 152 Idaho at 516 (quoting State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703 (1939)). Accordingly,

Idaho's exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence procured in violation of
Mr. Dunn's state constitutional rights.
Mindful that the evidence Mr. Dunn seeks to suppress may have inevitably been
discovered, Mr. Dunn asserts that Officer Kettering obtained the evidence from Mr. Dunn's car
by exploitation of the unconstitutional arrest. Thus, all evidence obtained by Officer Kettering
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should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Clarke, 165 Idaho at 395 n.2.
Therefore, the district court erred by denying Mr. Dunn's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Dunn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 24 th day of September, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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